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RECENT DECISIONS
Editor-JULIA M. COOK
BANKS AND BANKING-JOINT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS-STATU-
TORY PRESUMPTION OF GiF.-Defendant's testatrix had opened a
savings bank account in the joint names of herself and the plaintiff,
"payable to either or survivor." Later she closed the account and
deposited the money withdrawn in a new account in her own name.
Shortly before her death, desiring to reinstate the joint account, she
delivered the passbook for the individual account to plaintiff and di-
rected her to take the necessary steps for the re-establishment of the
account in the joint form. Owing to the reluctance of the bank to
make the change, the money was still in the individual account when
the depositor died. The Appellate Division had sustained a verdict
for the plaintiff on the ground that the statute, section 249, sub-
division 3 of the Banking Law1 created a conclusive presumption
of gift in her favor on the death of the depositor.2 On appeal,
Held, the death of the depositor merely opened the door to compe-
tent testimony of the intent with which the account was opened.
However, the testimony offered being incompetent the result reached
by the lower court must be affirmed. Marrow v. Moskowitz, 255
N. Y. 219, 174 N. E. 460 (1931).
The decision is important in that it completes the judicial in-
terpretation of section 249 of the Banking Law so far as it relates
to the presumptions created by the making of a joint savings de-
posit in the statutory form. During the joint lives of the parties
there exists a presumption of joint tenancy, rebuttable by proof of
a contrary intent. On the death of either one that presumption
becomes conclusive as to any money remaining in the account.3 As,
to moneys previously withdrawn the presumption of joint tenancy
continues rebuttable.
J.V.M.
CONFLICT OF LAws-APPLICATION OF MERCHANT MARINE ACT
TO STEVEDORES WORKING ON BOARD FOREIGN VEss-s.-Plaintiff's
intestate, an American citizen employed as a stevedore by a Dela-
ware corporation, was killed while unloading a vessel flying the
German flag in the harbor of New York. In an action brought to
'Laws of 1914, Ch. 369.
'Marrow v. Moskowitz, 230 App. Div. 1, 242 N. Y. Supp. 523 (1st Dept.
1930) ; (1930) 5 St. John's L. Rev. 116.
'Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 167 N. E. 506 (1929); (1929)
4 St. John's L. Rev. 120.
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recover damages under section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act,'
the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment of the trial Court dis-
missing the complaint on the ground that the Act had no applica-
tion in a suit for injuries to an employee of an American corporation
on a foreign vessel in American waters. 2 On certiorari, Held, re-
versed. The plaintiff is entitled to the benefits of the Act, the for-
eign registry of the vessel being immaterial. Uravic v. Jarka Co.,
282 U. S. 234, 51 Sup. Ct. 111 (1931).
The purpose of this Act is to promote the welfare of American
seamen and the maintenance of the American merchant marine. It
has been construed to include stevedores when engaged in a mari-
time service. 3 The authority of Congress to legislate in respect to
maritime matters has been sustained by the Supreme Court.4 A
foreign ship within the territorial waters of the United States is
subject to its jurisdiction and the Courts will administer justice
according to its laws, unless a different law be shown to apply.5
The rights of a plaintiff in an action ex delicto are those given him
by the country in whose territorial waters the injury occurred, 6
and crimes committed upon foreign private vessels may be punished
by the body politic having territorial jurisdiction.7 The state Court
denied the benefits of the Act of stevedores employed by an Ameri-
can concern merely because the injury occurred on a ship of foreign
registry,8 although the relationship of master and servant existed be-
tween the American concern and the harbor worker and there was
no contractual relationship between the latter and the foreign yes-
'Act of June 5, 1920, Ch. 250, Sec. 33, 41 Stat. at L. 988, 1007, U. S. C. A.,
Tit. 46, Sec. 688. This section provides for a right of action for damages
at law, with trial by jury, by the personal representative of any seaman suffer-
ing death from injuries received in the course of his employment. In such
action, all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right
of action for death in the case of railway employees are applicable. Under
the Employers Liability Act (U. S. C. A., Tit. 45, Secs. 51-59), recovery is
allowed even where the injuries are due to the negligence of a fellow servant.
Second Employers Liability Cases. 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup Ct. 391 (1911);
Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 44 Sup Ct. 391 (1923).
2252 N. Y. -530. 170 N. E. 131 (1929), aff'd on authority of Resigno v.
Jarka Co., 248 N. Y. 225, 162 N. E. 13 (1928) See Note (1928) 3 St. John's
L. Rev. 114.
'International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50, 47 Sup. Ct. 19
(1926); Buzynski v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 277 U. S. 226, 48 Sup. Ct. 440
(1928).
Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 100, 43 Sup. Ct. 504 (1923).
'The Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch. 116, 136 (U. S. 1812) ; The Lotta-
wanna, 21 Wall. 558, 571 (U. S. 1874); The Western Maid, 257 U. S. 419,
42 Sup. Ct. 159 (1922) ; Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, ibid.
'Williams v. Oceanic Stevedoring Co., 27 F. (2nd) 905 (D. C., S. D.
Tex. 1928).
7Wilderhus's Case, 120 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct. 383 (1887); Patterson v.
The Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 177, 23 Sup. Ct. 821 (1903).
'Sutpra note 2.
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sel or its owner.9 Thus, in effect, an Americati seaman became a
foreign seaman as soon as he stepped on board a foreign vessel, and
if he chanced to work on many ships in the course of a day, his
nationality would change in each instance to that of the ship on
which he was working. '0 The federal courts, on the other hand,
have held that an American seaman so employed is entitled to the
benefits of the Act." The purport of the Act being to benefit Ameri-
can seamen, to deny relief merely because the injury occurred on a
ship of foreign registry would be a strained and unreasonable
application of it.12
R.L.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE
RATES FOR PERSONAL SERVICES IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-Plain-
tiffs were all registered under the Packers and Stockyards Act,'
and comprised the entire membership of the Omaha Livestock Ex-
change. In an effort to secure a better return on their respective
investments, plaintiffs filed a new schedule of rates with the Secre-
tary of Agriculture. The latter, on his own motion, issued an order
suspending the operation of the proposed schedule and held a public
hearing on the reasonableness of the proposed rates. The Livestock
Exchange then sought an injunction restraining the Secretary of
Agriculture on the ground that the Act in question if construed to
give the Secretary of Agriculture such power would be in contra-
vention of the Fifth Amendment.2 Held, that Congress has power
to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to fix the rate of com-
pensation for personal services where the services are rendered in a
business that is subject to public regulation. Tagg Bros. and Moor-
head et al. v. U. S. et al., 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup. Ct. 220 (1929).
The plaintiff relied upon Tyson v. Bonton 3 and Ribnik v.
McBride,4 contending that those cases held that the rate of com-
pensation for personal services cannot be regulated. But Justice
'See Schotis v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 24 F. (2nd) 591 (D. C.,
Wash., 1927).
20 Zarowitch v. F. Jarka Co., 21 F. (2nd), 187 (D. C., N. Y., 1927);
Mahoney v. International Elevating Co., 23 F. (2nd) 130 (D. C., N. Y.
1927) ; aff'd 26 F. (2nd) 1019 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1928).
'Id., Williams v. Oceanic Stevedoring Co., supra note 6.
'-Williams v. Oceanic Stevedoring Co., ibid.
IU. S. C. A., Tit. 7, Secs. 201-217, 42 Stat. 159, 163-168.2 U. S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment.
2273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927). For a detailed and authoritative
consideration of this subject see Finkelstein, From Mum v. Illlhois to Tyson
v. Banton, A Study In the Judicial Process, (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 769.
'277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928). See also notes (1928) 3 St.
John's L. Rev. 104 and (1929) 3 St. John's L. Rev. 244.
